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Right-wing online news media have in many countries emerged as an important 
force in the media landscape, positioning themselves as an alternative to a perceived 
political and media mainstream. This article studies these sites as a cornerstone of 
right-wing digital news infrastructures in six Western democracies (Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, Austria, the UK, and the US). Drawing on content analyses of 
websites and social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter as well as on audience 
metrics, the article analyses content supply and audience demand structures, as well 
as organizational and thematic characteristics of 70 alternative right-wing online 
news sites. We find that a country’s media and political context, in particular the 
representation of right-wing positions in the political and legacy media sphere, can 
explain variation in the supply of and demand for right-wing news across countries, 
but is mitigated by transnational audiences. At the same time, we can account for 
cross-national heterogeneity of news sites, ranging from sites with a “normalized” 
appearance to more radical sites that clearly set themselves apart from legacy news 
outlets in terms of their thematic categories, their funding strategy, and their 
organizational transparency, leading to various types of digital right-wing 
“alternatives” to mainstream news. 
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The rise of right-wing populist parties and movements across Europe and 
the Trump presidency in the United States not only provide a challenge to 
established parliamentary politics, but also to traditional mass media as a 
cornerstone of democratic societies. Legacy media are confronted with decreasing 
levels of trust among the public, while right-wing actors and their supporters 
habitually accuse established media institutions of being too closely aligned with a 
political mainstream. In this context, online news sites—such as Breitbart, the 
German Compact magazine and Swedish Nyheter Idag—have in many countries 
emerged as a new force in the media landscape. Also referred to as “hyper- partisan 
media,” these right-wing online news media provide an alternative to legacy or 
mainstream media sources in times of high-choice media environments and rely on 
digital platforms to establish a new media infrastructure on the political right. The 
emergence of these partisan digital news sites is followed by an underlying concern 
that these sites and their social media appearances, in their entirety, provide a new 
infrastructure through which right-wing ideologies can be dispersed and around 
which communities can develop, which may foster further polarization and 
radicalization of political views within and across national and transnational public 
spheres—especially since their most committed audiences may be increasingly 
unlikely to be exposed directly to the so-called mainstream media (Benkler et al., 
2017; Newman et al., 2017).  
This study provides a closer and comparative look at this new digital news 
infrastructure on the political right by analyzing 70 European and US-American 
right-wing online news sites (RNS) and their accompanying social media accounts. 
All of these are marked by hyper-partisanship and a professed ambition to present 
an alternative to more established or “mainstream” news sources. With their claim 
to challenge power structures and their stance of being an alternative to a media 
mainstream they display features of the “alternative media” (Atkinson and Berg, 
2012; Haller, Holt and de La Brosse, 2019). While they attract significant amounts 
of user attention, as of yet there exist no comprehensive, comparative accounts of 
the characteristics of this news infrastructure, understood as the supply and demand 
of right-wing digital news, as well as its dissociation from legacy media in terms of 
organizational strategy and thematic tendency. The infrastructural perspective on 
this distinct political information environment (Van Aelst et al., 2017) on the right 
highlights its foundational and enabling character as opportunity structure for the 
diffusion of and interaction with right-wing news under digital conditions.    
As these news infrastructures are subject to important contextual conditions, 
we analyze right-wing digital news sites in six countries featuring distinct political 
and media contexts: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the US. 
Proceeding from the assumption that the embeddedness in particular media and 
political contexts is decisive for the emergence of specific news environments, we 
seek to answer the following two research questions: (1) Which commonalities and 
differences exist in the supply and demand of right-wing digital news in these six 
different countries, and how do these patterns correspond to variations in the media 
and political context? (2) Can distinct types of RNS be identified, and are these 
types country-specific or emerging cross-nationally?  
 
Studying Right-Wing Alternative Online News Media  
 
Despite being a rather new phenomenon, right-wing alternative news sites 
have rapidly become a cornerstone of the broader right-wing digital news 
infrastructure: Where right-wing ideology and news previously have been 
disseminated mainly by right-wing organizations, movements and parties, as well 
as through blogs and pundits, the last decade has seen a rise in numbers of websites 
that mark themselves as journalistic outlets in their own right, in opposition to 
merely delivering opinion- or movement-driven forms of communication (Benkler, 
Faris and Roberts, 2018; Newman et al., 2018). With few exceptions, these news 
outlets on the political right show clear characteristics of so-called “alternative” or 
“radical” media, i.e. media “that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, 
priorities, and perspectives” (Downing, 2001, v). Previously applied predominantly 
to progressive counter-hegemonic media, the term alternative media is increasingly 
used in current research to also denominate “repressive” or even anti-democratic 
media positioning themselves against a perceived societal mainstream (Downing, 
2001; Atton, 2006; Haller, Holt and de La Brosse, 2019). It is argued that the broad 
spectrum of alternative media is best understood and analysed in relational terms 
and thus “should be considered first and foremost in the light of a position as a self-
perceived corrective of ‘traditional’, ‘legacy’ or ‘mainstream’ news media in a 
given socio-cultural and historical context” (Holt, Figenschou and Frischlich, 
2019)1.  
The rise of such alternative and hyper-partisan media coincides more or less 
directly with the surge of populist movements, parties and governments seen in 
many established democracies during the last decades. This is not to say that 
alternative and hyper-partisan media should be seen as “populist media” by default. 
The degree to which such media actually support populist agendas or resort to 
populist forms of communication and rhetoric remains an empirical question.  
While we thus regard alternative media and populism as distinct phenomena, 
it is clear that the rise and role of alternative media must be seen in conjunction 
with the populist agenda currently gaining momentum around the globe. Just as 
populism is understood as a “thin ideology,” centered around a distinction between 
                                                 
1In consequence, this understanding of alternative media puts less emphasis on 
concepts traditionally evoked when defining and discussing the concept of 
alternative media in a progressive or left-wing context, such as active citizenship 
and citizen empowerment (Harcup, 2011; Fenton and Barassi 2011), but focuses 
on dissatisfaction with the existing media environment as the defining element for 
different types of alternative media.  
the people and a corrupt elite and a focus on the will of the people (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2017), alternative media are defined not by their attachment to a 
particular ideology or orientation, but rather by their anti-establishment position 
and contrast to legacy media (Downing, 2001; Atton, 2007; Holt, Figenschou and 
Frischlich, 2019).  
However, just as the thin ideology of populism is more or less invariably 
attached to “thick” ideologies by concrete populist parties and movements, many 
alternative media are also hyper-partisan media with clear ideological attachments. 
For alternative media on the political right this results in a combination of an anti-
hegemonic impetus and positions generally associated with right-wing ideology, 
such as conservatism, nationalism, economic liberalism, and—to the far right—
authoritarianism, xenophobia, islamophobia, racism, anti-semitism, fascism and 
nativism (Eatwell, 1989; Rydgren, 2018). Given their anti-hegemonic outlook, 
right-wing alternative media are in most cases ideologically placed at the fringes of 
the established center-right and right-wing political spectrum, taking stances and 
positions associated with labels such as “new right,” “alt-right,” “right-wing 
populist,” “far right” or even “extreme right.” 
This gravitation toward political extremes clearly has a potential to increase 
polarization in both the political and the media sphere (Levendusky, 2013; Benkler, 
Faris and Roberts, 2018). This is not only a matter of alternative media on the 
political right, as demonstrated by (albeit fewer) left-wing hyper-partisan online 
news outlets. However, alternative media also display a broader tendency 
associated with populism: the subjugation of traditional left/right polarization under 
the opposition between the people and those understood by populists to represent 
“the elite.” Indeed, some of the sites included in our study—such as the British 
Spiked or German Compact—have roots in the radical left-wing scene, but now 
oppose the political establishment from a position on the right side of the spectrum. 
In this way, RNS can be assumed to contribute to a deepening gap between 
alternative news audiences and a “corrupt” political and media establishment in a 
way that reflects the populist dynamics of social and political polarization (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser, 2018, 1682).  
Despite their increasing importance, research on RNS is still quite sparse. 
A number of studies have focused on related aspects, such as the spread of 
disinformation and fake news (e.g. Fletcher et al., 2018), extreme-right groups’ use 
of the Internet (e.g. Caiani and Kröll, 2015; Simpson and Druxes, 2015; Askanius, 
2019), and media populism (Krämer, 2017a, 2017b). However, only a few studies 
have analyzed hyper-partisan alternative media outlets and their critical role in the 
emergence of digital news infrastructures.  
Notable recent research on RNS has primarily been conducted in the US 
and focused on networked disinformation flows and spill-overs between RNS and 
mainstream media during the 2016 presidential campaign (Anderson, 2010; 
Benkler et al., 2017; 2018), as well as topical similarities between various types of 
right-wing online media (Kaiser, Rauchfleisch and Bourassa, 2018). Benkler et al.’s 
(2017, 2018) study on the right-wing news ecosystem showed how the website 
Breitbart arose as a central node on key issues within an informational network of 
right-wing ideological views during the 2016 election. These digitally enabled 
networks of hyper-partisan content providers have allowed for decentralized modes 
of disinformation campaigns, so-called “networked propaganda.” Based on topic 
modeling analysis, Kaiser, Rauchfleisch and Bourassa (2018) demonstrate how 
specific online media outlets like Breitbart function as bridges between more 
moderate or mainstream forms of media and the far-right.  
Research findings beyond the US context are sparser. Focusing on aspects 
of media criticism and media distrust as a fundament of so-called “immigrant-
critical alternative media” in Sweden, Holt (2016, 2018) argues that this alternative 
news environment is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity that is best 
analyzed in terms of the degree of “anti-systemness” exhibited by the different 
outlets in their communication on various platforms. Research on German-language 
RNS has so far mainly focused on their print editions, disregarding the increasing 
use of digital platforms by these outlets. Studies on outlets such as Junge Freiheit 
(Braun and Vogt, 2007; von Nordheim, Müller and Scheppe, 2019) or Compact 
(Schilk, 2017) show how these “new right” outlets challenge conventional 
understandings of right-wing ideology and rhetoric by adapting a populist style of 
communication and seeking linkages to left-wing movements (Compact), as well 
as by establishing a bridge between right-wing conservative and extreme-right 
positions (Junge Freiheit).  
Our study adds a comparative perspective to this emerging field of research 
on RNS, which considers the full spectrum of right-wing alternative digital news 
outlets, rather than focusing only on the most prominent outlets in each country. 
Thus, it contributes to a thorough understanding of the entirety of this new 
infrastructure and the contextual conditions shaping it.  
 
The Context Dependency of Digital News Infrastructures  
 
Our study draws on research characterizing media and political information 
environments as determined by context factors within a specific society 
(Brüggemann et al., 2014; Humprecht and Esser, 2017; Van Aelst et al., 2017). 
While this literature analyzes the supply and demand of political news and political 
information in general, our study proposes a number of more specific contextual 
conditions which are assumed to directly account for different patterns of right-
wing digital news infrastructures.  
First, high levels of media polarization in (online and offline) legacy media, 
as well as the inclusiveness of legacy media towards right-wing actors and positions 
are likely to make it harder for RNS to fill a market niche and attract audience 
attention. Secondly, and in a similar vein, trust in mainstream news might influence 
the demand and thus prospects of alternative online news providers on the right. 
Research for various countries consistently shows that the audiences who identify 
as right leaning are typically deeply distrustful of the news in general and are 
therefore more likely to use alternative media (Newman et al., 2018).  
Finally, regarding political contexts, the electoral success of right-wing 
parties and their participation in (or support of) governments can be seen as 
indicators of public tolerance towards far-right and right-wing populist positions, 
and thus for the extent to which such positions have institutionalized access to 
(mediated) public debate. In contexts where far-right and right-wing populist 
positions are marginalized in the public debate, niche media on the right might be 
more likely to flourish. This refers not only to the sheer quantity of RNS, but also 
to other characteristics of those media such as their organizational transparency, 
thematic tendency, or funding strategies.  
To test these assumptions, our study analyzes RNS in Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US. In all of these countries, online news is 
either the most important or, in the German case, second-most important news 
source (Newman et al., 2018). Thus, the RNS analyzed in this study all target 
audiences that frequently consume digital news. At the same time, these countries 
represent different types of media systems (Brüggemann et al., 2014) and differ in 
their political context, in particular with regard to the acceptance of far-right 
positions within the political sphere (see overview in Table 1).  
 
Political Context  
 
Sweden and Germany represent countries in which more extreme right-
wing positions are currently still rather marginalized. In Germany, the radical right 
had been relatively weak for decades (Arzheimer, 2009). Since 2013, however, the 
newly founded right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been on the 
rise (Arzheimer, 2015), reaching a vote share of almost 13 percent in the 2017 
general election.2 In Sweden, after decades in which radical right-wing parties had 
been comparatively unsuccessful, the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats (SD) 
have been continuously rising in political importance since entering the national 
parliament in 2010 (Strömbäck, Jungar and Dahlberg, 2017). Despite gaining 17.5 
percent of votes in the 2018 general election,3 they continue to be shunned by the 





remaining political parties, not least due to their roots in the white national 
movement.  
In contrast, the acceptance of more extreme right-wing views is much more 
pronounced in Denmark and Austria. In Denmark, the (liberal-conservative) 
government has until recently depended on the support of the right-wing populist 
Danish People’s Party (DF), which was the second strongest party in the 2015 
election (21.1 percent). Despite suffering substantial losses in the June 2019 
national election, DF must generally be regarded as an established force in Danish 
politics4. In Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a party with strong right-
wing positions and the third strongest force in the general election of 2017 (26 
percent),5 has joined a governing coalition with the Austrian People’s Party. 6  
While less clear-cut, more extreme right-wing views are also rather 
established in UK and US politics. Britain’s UK Independence Party (UKIP), which 
in the 2015 general election had attained 12.6 percent of the vote, later fell into 
insignificance (2017 general election: 1.8 percent).7 However, UKIP’s political 
agenda has increasingly found its way into the ruling conservative party, which 
tends relatively strongly towards the right (Polk et al., 2017), culminating not least 
in the Brexit referendum and the recent establishment of the ‘Brexit party’ at the 
European level. In the US, the success of sub-caucuses and coalitions within the 
Republican party structure, marked, for example, by the rise of the so-called Tea 
Party, can be seen as a gradual shift towards more extreme forms of right-wing 
politics (Mann and Ornstein, 2012). Arguably, the election of Trump in the 2016 
election with 46 percent vote share8 is a further indicator for an acceptance of a 




The Swedish and German traditional mass media can be described as having 
                                                 
4 http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/59/ (03.07.2019). 
5 https://wahl17.bmi.gv.at/ (03.07.2019). 
6 In the wake of the ‘Ibiza affair’, the coalition has de facto collapsed in May 
2019; elections are announced for September 2019.  
7 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
7979#fullreport. (23.07.2019). 
8 https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/federalelections2016.pdf (03.07.2019). 
9 While some of these differences in the acceptance of far right and right-wing 
populist positions certainly are due to different ideological, historical and 
personnel-based characteristics of the main political actors and parties 
representing these positions, they nevertheless provide an indicator for the degree 
to which such positions can be voiced in the political sphere in each country. 
a critical stance towards far-right and right-wing populist positions (e.g. Hellström 
and Hervik, 2014; Esser, Stepińska and Hopmann, 2017), which has not left much 
room for actors and positions from the far and populist right. In Germany, the 
critical tenor of the public media’s reporting on right-wing actors can be explained 
by the country’s historical context (Reinemann, 2017). In Sweden, the SD have also 
long been ostracized by the mainstream media. While the cordon sanitaire erected 
around the SD seems to have been wearing thin in recent years (Strömbäck, Jungar 
and Dahlberg, 2017), the presumed existence of a so-called “opinion corridor” 
limiting the range of issues and opinions expressed in mass media content remains 
a matter of public debate. Based on information about the political leaning of news 
audiences, Germany and Sweden display the lowest levels of online news media 
polarization (compared to the other countries in our sample), combined with a high 
level of trust in the German case (Newman et al., 2017, 2018).10 
Denmark and Austria, in contrast, provide mass media contexts that are 
favorable to right-wing actors and positions. In Denmark, a culture of public debate 
that allows for voicing of politically incorrect issues and opinions has resulted in a 
harsh tone of debate in the media, in particular with regard to immigration 
(Hellström and Hervik, 2014). Denmark’s legacy media indirectly supports the DF 
by heavily focusing on immigration in their reporting, for which the DF has issue 
ownership (Esser, Stepińska and Hopmann, 2017). The Austrian mass media also 
have a market-focused and populist newsroom logic that helps right-wing and 
populist actors such as the FPÖ to get attention (Plasser and Ulram, 2003). In both 
countries, online news media polarization is considerably higher than in their 
neighboring countries of Germany and Sweden. Yet, despite a relatively high 
polarization, trust in news overall is high in Denmark.  
The British mass media have a generally critical tone towards politicians 
and emphasize personalities, conflict, strategy and tactics (Esser, Stepińska and 
Hopmann, 2017). Wayne and Murray (2009, 416) ascribe a “populist antagonism 
towards politics that is personalized and anti-systemic in its focus” to UK television 
news. Popular newspapers, especially the highest-circulated The Sun, are expected 
to provide a favorable platform for populist politics (Akkerman, 2011). In the US, 
the current media landscape is marked by high degrees of fragmentation and 
ideological polarization (Hopkins and Ladd, 2014), which have given rise to a host 
of niche-oriented news sources, especially in cable television. Both in the UK and 
to an even more extreme degree in the US, online news polarization is high, while 
                                                 
10 The online news media polarization score is the mean of the polarization score 
for each of the top 15 online brands of a country (level of dispersion) multiplied 
by their weekly reach. See Newman et al. (2017, 40). All following data on the 
polarization score according to Newman et al. (2017). All data on trust in news 
according to the country chapters in Newman et al. (2018). 
trust in news is relatively low.  
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2.34  2.83  1.64  2.62  3.18  5.93  
Trust in 
news1  
41% 56% 50% 41% 42%  34% 
1Sources: Reuters Digital News Report 2017 and 2018; own compilation.  
 
Summing up, Sweden and Germany present contexts in which the supply of 
and demand for right-wing news is most likely to rely on alternative modes of news 
production and dissemination. In Denmark and Austria, the incentives and demand 
for right-wing alternative media can in turn be expected to be less pronounced. In 
the UK, the lack of a strong, consistent right-wing populist party on the one hand 
and a media landscape that is inclusive of right-wing views on the other, suggest 
mixed potential for a flourishing alternative right-wing news scene. In the US, both 
the contextual conditions in the political and media sphere, where right-wing 
positions are well-established, would also suggest a rather limited potential for 
alternative right-wing online news. However, extremely low levels of trust in news 




Selection of Right-wing Online News Media  
 
We examine alternative online news media that distribute right-wing views via 
websites and their respective social media accounts on Twitter and Facebook. To 
identify RNS, we first compiled a list of potential RNS based on an extensive 
literature search on right-wing media, on information provided by monitoring 
organizations, fact-checking websites and watchdog lists concerned with right-
wing activities in each country, as well as on input by country experts researching 
right-wing media and/or politics. This collection resulted in a list of around 150 
sites, of which 70 sites were ultimately classified as RNS based on the following 
four criteria (see Table 1, Appendix, for a full list of RNS included in the study):  
(1) By online news media we refer to digital news providers offering: (a) at 
least a rudimentary form of “institutionalized journalism” (Wolf, 2014, 72) by self-
describing as a news media offer or by giving information on editorial 
responsibility; and (b) that provide current, non-fictional content with a given 
periodicity. With this definition, we exclude blogs, understood as a genre for online 
self-publishing by only one or a few people characterized by a chronological series 
of posts (Chandler and Munday, 2016) and often written in a conversational style. 
We explicitly focus on sites for which the main content is text-based, thus excluding 
online broadcasters and radio stations. We include media offers that feature an 
offline print version, as long as the website is not merely used for cross-promoting 
the print version.  
(2) Following the definition proposed by Holt, Figenschou and Frischlich 
(2019), we categorize a given online news outlet as “alternative” based on the self-
description of the news outlet as a corrective to a perceived political and media 
mainstream, i.e. if the front page or about section of the website or the social media 
channels features a self-description as alternative / different / anti-mainstream / 
revolutionary, and/or features (variants of) the following keywords and phrases: 
politically incorrect / controversial / provocative, “focusing on issues disregarded 
by other media”, “free of censorship / dedicated to the freedom of the press,” and 
“committed to the truth.” 
(3) We classify an alternative online news site as right-wing if it: (a) 
explicitly declares a right-wing political standpoint on the front page or about 
section of the website or social media channels, either by calling itself right-wing, 
by referring to ideological positions associated with the political right, or by taking 
an explicit stance against the political left; and/or (b) that displays a right-wing 
thematic focus on the website’s front page, as made apparent in article tags, article 
keywords or topical categories. We exclude libertarian, as well as religious sites, to 
make our selection more comparable internationally, as this is a particularly US-
based phenomenon.  
(4) We allocate RNS to one of the six countries under study by assessing 
the self-description, legal notice, contact data, top-level domain, and language 
profile of a site. We exclude genuinely transnational offers that do not have their 
head office in one of the above-mentioned countries.11 We also exclude offers 
primarily targeted at regional and local communities.  
Indicators and measures. Applying the concept of a political information 
environment (Van Aelst et al., 2017) to the partisan news niche of right-wing online 
news media, we analyzed supply- and demand-side indicators with respect to the 
identified RNS. Our analysis includes the websites of the 70 RNS, their Twitter and 
Facebook accounts (if they existed) and audience web metrics data made available 
through Alexa.com.  
(1) Activity in content supply. With respect to the websites, we 
operationalize activity in content dissemination as the number of articles in a period 
of four weeks in June/July 2018, based on data collected through the Media Cloud 
database.12 For Twitter, we assess the activity of a medium by the number of tweets 
in a period of four weeks (June 2018). Twitter data were automatically retrieved via 
DMI’s Twitter Collection and Analysis Toolkit (Borra and Rieder, 2014).13 
(2) Audience demand. To measure website demand, we rely on data 
collected by Alexa, a company providing web audiences and traffic data 14 
(Mukerjee, Majó-Vázquez and González-Bailón, 2018). Since we deal with niche 
sites, we were not able to retrieve reliable estimated unique visitor data for all RNS. 
For a rough approximation on attention attracted, we rely on the rank a website has 
in a given country, providing information on whether a medium is among the top 
                                                 
11 Media with head office in one country and additional offices in other countries 
are classified as belonging to the head office’s country. 
12 Media Cloud is an open source platform that collects news stories through the 
RSS feeds of online media sources. The platform is a project by the MIT Center 
for Civic Media and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard 
University (https://mediacloud.org). We thank Annissa Pierre and Anushka Shah 
for support with setting up the country-based collections for the websites included 
in this study. 
13 Due to Facebook’s newest API restrictions, it is currently only possible for us to 
draw on its data for the demand side. 
14 Alexa traffic estimates are based on data from a global traffic panel, which is a 
sample of millions of Internet users using one of many different browser 
extensions, as well as on traffic data from websites that have installed the Alexa 
script. 
pages of a country or not.15 With respect to the Twitter and Facebook accounts of 
the RNS, we operationalize user attention (demand) by the number of followers on 
Twitter and the number of Facebook subscriptions. Twitter follower data stem from 
our automatically retrieved collection. Facebook subscriber data were collected 
manually from the respective accounts on August 2, 2018.  
(3) RNS characteristics. To further characterize the right-wing news 
infrastructures under study, we collected indicators that can be directly observed on 
the websites by means of a manual content analysis (see online appendix for the 
standardized codebook).16 We coded the platforms of content distribution besides 
the website, form of organization and location, the sources of funding (as 
discernible on the website) as well as—with respect to content-related 
characteristics—the amount and type of news categories of the websites. We 
created three indices in order to classify our RNS. All measures are designed to 
capture the extent to which RNS appear like a “regular” news site, interpreted as a 
strategy of “normalization” as opposed to more radical RNS. Transparency: In all 
countries, online news media are either legally required or generally expected to 
disclose responsibilities for media reporting, not least to be able to issue complaints 
and assert legal remedies. Thus, we create a transparency index based on whether 
RNS provide a postal address (+1) and information on editorial staff (+1). A 
website’s transparency score can range from 0–2. Advertisement reliance: 
Advertisement is still an important form of financing for professional mass media 
(Cornia et al., 2017). We regard the funding structure, in particular RNS’s reliance 
on advertisement revenues, as one indicator of their organizational strategy to 
establish themselves either as independent niche media with alternative sources of 
funding, or rather to strive for a business model geared towards broad audiences. 
We rely on the information on sources of income that can be observed directly on 
the news site, since we are interested in the appearance of RNS to a recipient and 
the hints given to them to evaluate a site. Advertisement reliance is understood as 
the reliance on advertisement revenues vis-á-vis other sources of income, namely 
                                                 
15 The Alexa country-specific ranking is a measurement of how a website ranks in 
a particular country relative to other sites over the past month. The rank is 
calculated using a combination of average daily visitors and page views. The 
study by Mukerjee, Majó-Vázquez and González-Bailón (2018) tests the data 
quality by comparing comScore and Alexa reach rankings and shows that the rank 
positions of news outlets are very similar in both panels. 
16 All homepages were stored offline between June 21 and July 5, 2018. Coding 
was done by a team of four coders. Intercoder reliability tests resulted in Holsti 
coefficients of 1.0 for print, 0.95 for platform usage, 0.90 for platform 
information, 0.94 for funding, and 0.90 for topic categories (four coders, n = 10 
websites). 
print revenues, online subscription models, donations, and online shops. The 
website’s advertisement reliance index ranges from –10 (lowest level of 
dependency: no advertisement and several other forms of financing) to +10 (highest 
level of dependency: exclusively financed via advertising). For websites with 
advertisement, the score is calculated as 1/total number of funding types*10. For 




Finally, RNS may also be distinguished based on particular ways to gear 
and present their content towards a specific audience. Here, we focus on the right-
wing tendency displayed by the thematic categories on RNS homepages.  
To determine the tendency of homepage categories, we distinguish between 
conventional news categories (such as Politics, Culture, Opinion, Sports), news 
categories that address policy fields or use phrases particular to alternative right-
wing media (such as Immigration, Freedom of Opinion, Terror, Mainstream Media), 
and unconventional news categories with no clear right-wing slant (e.g. Animal 
Rights, Survival).18 We calculate an index ranging from –10 to +10 indicating to 
what degree a website’s thematic categories can be described as conventional vs 
right-wing specific. For each category, we assign a value of –10 for right-wing 
categories, a value of 0 for unconventional but non-partisan categories, and +10 for 
conventional categories. The more conventional a website’s thematic categories, 
the more an audience strategy of “normalization” may be in place, where RNS 
refrain from openly flagging their right-wing bias, instead striving to appear like a 
regular news site.  
 
Right-Wing Digital News Infrastructures in Six Countries  
 
The 70 media that fulfill our criteria of alternative right-wing online news 
site distribute somewhat unevenly across the six countries. Table 2 displays the total 
number of RNS identified for each country, as well as the number of news sites 
included per million inhabitants. While these numbers must be compared with 
caution,19 they provide a first indication of systemic variation in the supply side of 
                                                 
17 No source of funding discernible on website = 0. 
18 We define a category as conventional, if it has appeared in at least two out of 
three leading quality newspapers’ online sites in at least one of our countries (see 
codebook, online appendix). Classification was done by two coders under the 
condition of unanimous consensus. 
19 As is the case with the legacy media market, many other characteristics may 
account for the number of media outlets in a given country, such as audience size 
right-wing digital news infrastructures. 
In absolute figures, the largest number of RNS (36) matching our criteria is 
found in the US. The perhaps most well-known examples among our list include 
Breitbart, The Daily Caller, The Blaze, Townhall, and RedState. In Sweden, 10 
online news sites met our criteria, ranging from the neo-Nazi Nordfront and the 
network-based “troll factory” Granskning Sverige, to well-established online native 
news sites such as Fria Tider, Nyheter Idag, and Samhällsnyt. In Germany, we 
could identify 10 online news sites. Among the best-known are Junge Freiheit and 
Compact online, both originally long-standing print offers, as well as PI News. In 
Austria, the selection of eight RNS ranges from the eclectic Alpenschau to the more 
prominent sites Unzensuriert, Contra Magazin, and Info Direkt. In Denmark, only 
three sites matched our criteria, of which only Den korte avis can be regarded as a 
rather established site. The three British news sites are the pro-Brexit Westmonster, 
the far-right Heritage and Destiny, and Spiked.  
Based on population size, the highest relative number of RNS can be found 
in Sweden, followed by Austria and Denmark, while the relative count is lowest for 
the UK. These numbers only correspond to the assumed differences in right-wing 
digital news supply for the Northern type of media systems. For the Central and 
Western groups, the number of Austrian outlets is far higher than expected, while 
numbers are lower than expected for Germany and in particular for the UK.  
In the UK, the low number of institutionalized RNS can partly be explained 
by a national particularity of its overall right-wing news infrastructure. Social media 
accounts of numerous right-wing activists and pundits on Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube successfully serve this spectrum, apparently in lieu of dedicated online 
news sites (HOPE not hate, 2018). Together with a tabloid press that is extremely 
inclusive of populist positions (Akkerman, 2011), the market may simply be too 
saturated for the establishment of new institutionalized online media on the right. 
A more general explanation is supplied by transnational news audiences. Many 
Austrian sites cater to a wider German-speaking audience and are in fact 
predominantly accessed by users from Germany. In the UK, the US-based Breitbart 
is by far the most-visited RNS, outpacing the UK native sites by a wide margin.  
Whether or not the right-wing news infrastructure is flourishing in a given 
country cannot be gleaned only from the number of RNS. For a more complete 
picture, it is necessary to consider how actively these sites produce and disseminate 
content—and how actively such content is being sought out by media users.  
                                                 
or the importance of regional media. In addition, the comparison is based on the 
assumption of complete identification of all sites fulfilling our selection criteria at 
the time of our study. While we secured this as best as  possible through the steps 
of our methodical approach, without official registers etc. there is no possibility of 
final verification. 
 
Supply of Content 
 
As shown in Table 2, the US is not only the country with the largest number 
of RNS, but also with the most active ones. Both on their websites and on Twitter,20 
US sites are far more active at disseminating news than their counterparts in Europe. 
Despite the high average number of articles, at the time of analysis we could also 
observe a number of extremely inactive sites with less than one article published 
per day on average (gotnews.com, FrontPageMag, Disobedient Media and The 
Federalist), whereas six websites (Townhall, The Daily Caller, Breitbart, NewsMax 
Daily Wire and WorldNet Daily) fall into the category of extremely active media 
with more than 30 articles per day. Turning to the European sites, the level of 
content supply appears more balanced, both within and across countries. The 
observed country differences do however correspond rather well with our 
expectations. On average, RNS in Sweden and Germany are providing more 
content than their counterparts in Denmark, Austria and—though only with regard 
to website-based content supply—the UK. Moreover, the Swedish news 
infrastructure stands out as the most even in terms of content supply, featuring a 
number of overall rather active news sites, without a clear leader. The news 
infrastructure appears to be more dispersed in the remaining countries. Some sites 
are overall very inactive, while a select number of outlets take a clear lead in terms 
of supplying content both via their website and social media: 24nyt in Denmark, 





A high level of supplied content is not of course a guarantee that such 
content also finds an audience. Turning to the demand side, we can observe that the 
right-wing news infrastructures correspond to the contextual constraints present in 
our countries, in particular when focusing on the news sites’ national page rank. In 
Sweden, RNS appear to be the most established overall, judged by user demand: of 
the nine sites for which Alexa data is available, eight—including right-wing 
extremist Nordfront—are among the top 1000 of Swedish websites. Three (Fria 
Tider, Nyheter Idag, Samhällsnyt) even rank among the top 200. Next in line is 
Germany, where three out of nine sites are among the top 1000 (two of them, PI 
                                                 
20 Most of the media studied have both a Facebook page (66 out of 70) and a 
Twitter account (66 out of 70), while other social media platforms (such as 
YouTube, VK, Google Plus, Instagram) are used more selectively by individual 
websites. 
News and Journalistenwatch, even among the top 300) and a total of six among the 
top 5000. In the US, the majority of news sites does not make it into the top 5000 
of websites, but the digital news infrastructure is by no means entirely ultra-niche. 
The top four (Breitbart, Daily Caller, The Western Journal, The Daily Wire) are 
ranked in the higher end of the top 1000, and Breitbart at rank 65 even represents 
the (nationally) highest ranked website of all RNS investigated here. In Austria, 
only Unzensuriert ranks among the top 1000 websites. Noticeably, however, many 
of the Austrian sites actually rank substantially higher in Germany than they do in 
their country of origin, indicating a substantial degree of transnationality of 
audience demand. In Denmark and the UK, finally, even the better-known RNS 
(such as Den korte avis or Westmonster) can be called a niche offer at best. Also in 
the UK, this is not least a matter of transnationality: UK web traffic for US sites 
like Breitbart21 and The Daily Caller is far higher than for the domestic RNS.  
The picture is more blurred for social media demand due to the fact that the 
demand structures first and foremost appear to be tilted towards English-language 
offers, as indicated by the high demand for US (overall) and UK sites (when 
compared to the limited supply structure and website demand). On Twitter, 
Breitbart News (with roughly 950k followers) tops the US and presumably the 
global right-wing digital news infrastructure; the runner-up The Blaze also gathers 
almost 700k followers and on Facebook it is in fact the DailyCaller with around 
five million followers that takes the lead by a margin. The English-language bias 
of social media is also underlined by the fact that the Swedish-founded, partly US-
based and English-language RedIce TV is in highest demand on both Facebook and 
Twitter in Sweden, despite the fact that the site only offers limited content and is 
also rather unknown in both countries. For the non-English speaking sites, the 
average number of Twitter followers is highest in Sweden and Germany, which 
mirrors both the supply side, as well as the overall context expectations rather well. 
Average Facebook subscription rates are in turn rather even across all countries, 
excepting the US.  
 
Table 2. Supply and demand indicators by country  





10 3 10  8  3  36  
Websites 
included per 1 
million 
1  0.5  0.1  0.9  0.05  0.1  
                                                 
21 From a user perspective, Breitbart London is sometimes presented as a UK 
website (e.g. Newman et al. 2018). As it is organizationally not a free-standing 
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1 Twitter and Facebook data are based on websites active in the month of data collection; number 
of active sites in brackets; 2Alexa data is not available for all RNS; number of sites included in 
Alexa in brackets.  
 
Classifying RNS Across Countries  
 
Our analyses so far have shown that the country factors examined can 
explain part of the variance in the supply and demand structures of right-wing 
online media. We now turn to further characterizing these sites in their 
organizational and content-related structures in order to analyze whether national 
contexts also bring about particular types of RNS or whether different types of RNS 
emerge across countries. The three indicators used to describe the RNS in our 
study—namely, transparency, advertisement reliance, and tendency—are measures 
to differentiate more radical RNS from sites with a more “normalized” news site 
appearance.  
Being transparent about who bears journalistic responsibility can be seen as 
one aspect of the organizational strategy of RNS. The majority of RNS can be 
classified as fully transparent (n=37; 53 percent) or partly transparent (n=24; 34 
percent), and these sites scatter across all countries (for details, see Appendix Table 
A1). The number of RNS that qualify as fully non-transparent is small (n=9; 13 
percent). These RNS appear mostly as outsiders in each country and do not group 
together with regard to other factors, such as a particular level of advertisement 
reliance or their supply and demand structure. Although our data show a 
pronounced in-country heterogeneity with regard to the overall level of 
transparency, we can also account for some more systematic country variation. 
Zooming in on the less transparent RNS, we can see that the northern countries and 
the US tend to be less transparent in terms of location and are thus also less likely 
to achieve full transparency as defined by our scale (see Appendix Table A2). The 
level of transparency appears unrelated to both the degree of establishment of the 
right-wing news infrastructure in a given country, as well as to an individual site’s 
standing within this infrastructure. Moreover, even with a full disclosure of location 
and editorial staff, a news site might still be concealing or at least not actively 
highlighting vital pieces of information on their organizational underpinnings. The 
prime example here is the Swedish Samtiden, which discloses its publishing house’s 
organizational form, location and editorial staff, but not that the publishing house 
is owned by a political party, namely the right-wing populist SD (who presumably 
also provide some form of funding, given that no other sources of funding could be 
identified).22 
The organizational strategy can further be described by RNS’s reliance on 
advertising revenues. The majority of RNS partly depend on advertising revenues 
(mean 4.3, SD 3.9, n=70). This applies to established RNS such as Breitbart, The 
Daily Caller, Nyheter Idag, as well as far-right magazines such as Nordfront and 
Heritage and Destiny, and several niche RNS. In most cases, the funding portfolio 
consists in advertisement plus one other form of income (for the less established 
sites often in the form of donations). Only a small minority of RNS, many of which 
hail from Sweden, are entirely independent of advertising revenues. Finally, around 
20 percent of our RNS are exclusively funded through advertisement. None of these 
outlets is among the leading sites in terms of supply and demand, and with the 
exception of German Politikstube, they are all based in the US.  
The in-country heterogeneity does not mean, however, that country 
differences do not play a role at all. Most prominently, Sweden stands out as a right-
wing news infrastructure that is largely advertising-independent (mean –0.3, SD 
4.5, n=10). At the other end of the spectrum, we find the US to feature a number of 
heavily advertising-dependent sites (mean 5.8, SD 3.5, n=36), largely discarding 
                                                 
22 Also in other countries, individual RNS entertain close relations to right-wing 
populist parties, e.g. Unzensuriert to the Austrian FPÖ and Freie Welt to the 
German AfD, however not in the form of direct ownership. 
the funding sources more common to alternative and movement-based media, such 
as donations and shops. 
Regarding RNS’s right-wing tendency, the sites scatter heterogeneously 
across countries, with the German PI News, Danish Den Korte Avis, Swedish 
Nordfront, and US Breitbart openly flagging their right-wing slant from the off, 
while other RNS across all six countries structure their website content in a more 
conventional way—the presumably right-wing slant of the articles bundled into 
these conventional categories notwithstanding (mean 4.1, SD 4.5, n=61). However, 
some country differences are also seen in the right-wing tendency of RNS’s topical 
categories. Swedish and Austrian RNS are on average most conventional in their 
thematic categories. When looking beyond the prominent exceptions of PI News 
and Journalistenwatch, many German RNS also refrain from predominantly 
gearing their thematic categories to particular right-wing issues such as Islam or 
immigration. This picture changes substantially for the two countries with the least 
established online right-wing news infrastructure, namely Denmark and the UK, 
where right-wing and unconventional categories dominate. In the US, finally, RNS 
are very diverse with regard to their right-wing tendency.  
Overall, our data shows that RNS with a more pronounced right-wing bias 
in their topical categories are more likely to be non-transparent about their editorial 
responsibility and location (Pearsons correlation, 0.387, p<0.01). On the other hand, 
RNS with stronger right-wing tendency and low transparency are not necessarily 
relying on alternative sources of financing.23 Rather, there is a great diversity of 
RNS, each of which can be described with its own combination of organizational 
strategy, content-related tendency, funding structure, and activity pattern. 
Nevertheless, four patterns describe the more distinct types, in which almost 40 
percent of the RNS studied can be classified. Those patterns are again not country 












                                                 
23 Pearson’s correlation for tendency and transparency with activity of a site as per 
articles per month and with reliance on advertising each not significant. 
Figure 1. Classifying RNS: extreme cases  
 
 
Note: “Extreme” cases for metric variable tendency (–10 to +10) include RNS within the lower 25 
percentile (–9.60 to 0.41) = right-wing tendency of categories and RNS within the top 25 percentile 
(7.93 to 10.00) = conventional tendency. For categorical variable transparency (0 to 2), RNS with 0 
(non-transparent) and 2 (high transparency) are included. 
 
 
The most extreme pattern describes RNS, which show a strong right-wing 
tendency in their thematic categories, and which are non-transparent regarding 
editorial responsibility. The German PI News is one example of this type, 
displaying an extreme right-wing slant, while being among the more active German 
RNS and quite diversified in its funding structure. Danish NewSpeek Networks, in 
contrast, can be described as a niche offer at best, and is partly financed by 
donations. The second pattern comprises sites with a clear right-wing tendency, 
which are nevertheless transparent and, in this sense, professional. This pattern 
includes the small far-right magazine Heritage and Destiny, and the equally small 
Den Korte Avis, but also Breitbart, which is among the top US websites. Breitbart’s 
approach clearly seems to be geared towards building a global and rather decisive 
right-wing news brand rather than trying to “normalize” its appearance. The most 
normalized pattern, however, is the one which includes most of the uniquely 
classifiable cases. Obviously, many RNS across countries already show a quite 
normalized appearance, combining a rather conventional structure of website 
content with (at least ostensible) transparency. Those patterns include many long-
standing sites, such as Wochenblick and Junge Freiheit, with stable supply and 
demand structures. If we consider the large group of RNS that cannot be classified 
into the four core patterns, we see that the biggest group (n=16) is on the verge of 
normalization, representing sites that combine a moderate right-wing tendency with 
high transparency. Finally, to give website content a conventional outlook without 
providing transparency is obviously not a prominent prototype. The only example 
of this pattern is the Swedish Svegot.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Right-wing digital news sites are an important feature of the new landscape 
of alternative or hyper-partisan media, and therefore also of the mounting challenge 
of populism and related patterns of polarization in many consolidated democracies. 
The potential impact of hyper-partisan media on public deliberation, audiences, and, 
in the long run, democratic culture, is therefore a matter of growing importance. 
However, research in this area is still relatively sparse. In order to expand this 
emerging body of research, our study provides a better understanding of right-wing 
digital news infrastructures and the national conditions under which they emerge.  
The scope of this study obviously comes with some limitations. First, we 
have focused on a strictly defined set of text-based RNS, thus disregarding video-
based news channels that are also becoming increasingly important in right-wing 
news environments. Secondly, our analysis of website content refers to the thematic 
categories that are used by RNS, but not to the style and tendency of the published 
articles themselves. Given that the emergence of right-wing alternative news 
infrastructures speaks directly to the populist challenge in current democracies, 
further research is needed to assess the degree to which RNS themselves actually 
adhere to and apply populist rhetoric and style in their articles and posts, and thus 
also, to what degree their news output has the potential to contribute to a widening 
gap between the people and the elites, on top of or maybe even opposed to a more 
traditional form of polarization along the left–right axis. Finally, more research is 
needed to shed light on the transnational dimensions of the emerging right-wing 
news ecologies, focusing on transnational audiences, as well as on transnational 
communicative and organizational ties between RNS.  
That said, our study has unearthed systematic variation in the supply of and 
demand for right-wing news across countries, in particular with regard to the 
countries pertaining to the ‘Central’ and ‘Northern’ media systems (Brüggemann et 
al. 2014): As expected, the activity patterns on the websites and the demand by 
audiences show that the Swedish and German sites are more active and have a more 
established user base than their Danish and Austrian counterparts. For the ‘Western’ 
media systems (UK and US), the partly contradicting contextual conditions in the 
media and political systems have pointed to a more mixed potential for right-wing 
news in both countries. Supply of and demand for UK-based RNS is generally low, 
while the US features an active right-wing news infrastructure that is however 
dominated by a few particularly active sites.  
At the same time, some of the emerging supply and demand patterns only 
partly correspond to our overall expectations. Most noticeably, supply and demand 
of right-wing digital news proves to be lower than expected for the UK sites and 
somewhat higher than expected for the Austrian sites. While UK audiences resort 
primarily to US-based outlets, the Austrian right-wing news infrastructure is fueled 
by an extremely large share of German users. Thus, our results show that 
transnational audiences and shared language areas are a vital component in 
understanding right-wing news infrastructures on a national level.  
Although the organizational and content-related strategies of RNS also 
show some country-specific particularities, the national right-wing digital news 
infrastructures display significant similarities in this respect. In all countries, we 
find a situation where different types of RNS occupy specific hyper-partisan news 
niches, ranging from RNS with a more “normalized” appearance, to more radical 
RNS that clearly set themselves apart from the news mainstream in terms of their 
thematic categories, their funding strategy, and their organizational transparency. 
In other words, the larger right-wing news environment in each country does not 
seem to bring about convergence or streamlining of RNS towards one dominant 
type. Thus, we are in fact dealing with a variation of “alternatives” when referring 
to alternative media on the political right. We find different patterns of supply and 
demand, as well as distinct funding structures, organizational strategies, and 
thematic tendency. This heterogeneity provides an important corrective to 
simplistic interpretations of hyper-partisan media as mere “fake news media” or 
“junk media.” That being said, our analysis also provides an indication that many 
RNS across countries seem to be developing towards normalization in terms of their 
content-based and organizational strategies. While many of these “normalized” 
websites are characterized by rather stable supply and demand structures, we can 
also account for extreme niche sites with a rather conventional appearance, just as 
we find larger sites that feature clearly partisan thematic categories and/or lack 
basic editorial transparency. Whether individual RNS appear as normalized rather 
than radical is thus not directly related to the sizes of their audiences.  
The normalization of RNS challenges current digital news environments in 
that such a strategy makes it increasingly hard for audiences to discern hyper-
partisan from regular online news. At the same time, this majority strategy of 
normalization might add an additional incentive or pressure to the remaining RNS 
to radicalize even further—in order to not only provide a counterpoint to established 
media, but also to a normalized right-wing media. Indeed, we might witness an even 
more explicit division of labor between more normalized and radical RNS, as right-
wing digital news infrastructures expand and evolve.  
An issue of particular, and more normative, concern in the emerging debate 
is whether alternative and hyper-partisan media can be contained not only by 
increased regulation (such as hate speech laws or social media policies to counter 
the spread of nationalist content), but also by a political and legacy media system 
that is more forthcoming to the representation of right-wing actors and positions. 
Although our analysis is not geared towards normative evaluations, our results 
show that the marginalization of right-wing views and positions in media and 
politics will eventually make the establishment of a thriving right-wing digital news 
infrastructure more likely. Yet, given the substantial transnational user base of some 
of the investigated RNS, a political and media landscape that is relatively open 
towards right-wing positions is not an automatic safeguard against a flourishing 
right-wing news infrastructure. Moreover, it remains a question for future research 
whether increasing openness towards right-wing positions in legacy media and 
mainstream politics in countries like Sweden or Germany will eventually result in 
a regressing supply of and demand for alternative right-wing news, or whether these 
alternative online news media, once they have successfully positioned themselves, 
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